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Abstract
This paper addresses the challenge of modeling human reasoning, within a new framework
called Cognitive Argumentation. This framework rests on the assumption that human logical
reasoning is inherently a process of dialectic argumentation and aims to develop a cognitive
model for human reasoning that is computational and implementable. To give logical reasoning
a human cognitive form the framework relies on cognitive principles, based on empirical and
theoretical work in Cognitive Science, to suitably adapt a general and abstract framework of
computational argumentation from AI.
The approach of Cognitive Argumentation is evaluated with respect to Byrne’s suppres-
sion task, where the aim is not only to capture the suppression effect between different groups
of people but also to account for the variation of reasoning within each group. Two main
cognitive principles are particularly important to capture human conditional reasoning that ex-
plain the participants’ responses: (i) the interpretation of a condition within a conditional as
sufficient and/or necessary and (ii) the mode of reasoning either as predictive or explanatory.
We argue that Cognitive Argumentation provides a coherent and cognitively adequate model
for human conditional reasoning that allows a natural distinction between definite and plau-
sible conclusions, exhibiting the important characteristics of context-sensitive and defeasible
reasoning.
1 Introduction
How do humans reason? What conclusions do they draw? Can we provide a satisfactory explana-
tion to these questions by means of a coherent, computational and cognitively adequate model? A
∗The authors are mentioned in alphabetical order.
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computational model that is able to reproduce human reasoning in a faithful way while at the same
time accounting for the variability in the reasoning observed across the population?
In this paper we aim to contribute in addressing this challenge by formulating and studying
human reasoning within the framework of Cognitive Argumentation. This is a framework that is
built by synthesizing together the general and abstract theory of computational argumentation from
AI with cognitive principles born out of empirical and theoretical findings of Cognitive Science.
We will examine how Cognitive Argumentation could give a new underlying formal basis for
human reasoning through an in depth and extensive analysis of Byrne’s (1989) suppression task,
one of the most well-known psychological experiments on human (conditional) reasoning.
But why argumentation? Humans reason with knowledge whose generic form is that of an
association or link between different pieces of information. In contrast to formal logical reason-
ing which is strict and rigid and rarely matches that of human reasoning at large, argumentation
provides a more flexible logical framework, both in the representation of knowledge, that is closer
to the generic form of associations and in the actual process of reasoning to conclusions. It is a
framework well suited for handling conflicting and dynamically changing information, as indeed
is the case we are confronted with in our everyday human-level reasoning.
Support for argumentation exists from the early work of Aristotle on dialectic syllogistic rea-
soning to numerous works in Cognitive Science and Philosophy in the last century and more re-
cently in AI. Two recent results provide direct support in favour of the alternative of argumentation
for human reasoning. Firstly, there is now strong evidence from Cognitive Psychology in various
studies, brought together in the work of Mercier and Sperber (2011), that humans arrive at con-
clusions and justify these by arguments. Arguments are the means for human reasoning and the
process of reasoning is one of evaluation, elaboration and acceptance or rejection of arguments.
Secondly, recent results have shown that such an argumentative form of reasoning, or Argumenta-
tion Logic as it is called in (Kakas, Mancarella, & Toni, 2018; Kakas, 2019), can be arranged to
give, as a special case, a reasoning process that is completely equivalent to classical logical entail-
ment. Hence the departure of argumentation from formal logic is not radical, but instead one that
uniformly encompasses both formal and informal reasoning.
1.1 Cognitive Argumentation
Cognitive Argumentation emerges out of the synthesis of formal argumentation theory in AI and
empirical and theoretical studies of the psychology of reasoning from Cognitive Psychology and
Philosophy. Formal argumentation in AI provides a good computational basis for argumentation
but for this to become a cognitive model for human reasoning it needs to be informed and guided
by cognitive principles of human thinking that have been emerging out of studies in Cognitive
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Psychology over many decades now. Cognitive Argumentation therefore puts an emphasis on
accommodating empirical observations of human reasoning and letting this phenomenology guide
its development.
In realizing Cognitive Argumentation we need to consider how cognitive principles affect and
to a certain extent determine the construction and evaluation of arguments. The construction of
arguments would be based on cognitive argument schemes (a central notion in the study of argu-
mentation (Toumlin, 1958; Pollock, 1995; Walton, 1996)) that capture the typical common sense
knowledge about our physical world or about our human behavior, physical, mental or emotional.
Cognitive principles should also guide the selection of which cognitively valid argument schemes
to actually use under the different dynamically changing conditions of the environment in which
the argumentation reasoning process takes place. This selection depends on a process of aware-
ness of relevant argument schemes under the current circumstances which in turn is guided by
belief biases and other extra-logical assumptions made by humans.
The dynamic nature of real-life human reasoning presents a major challenge for any cognitive
model of human reasoning. New information can have a major effect on the reasoning and hence
any computational cognitive model needs to be properly immersed into the external environment,
adapting to new and changing contextual information. Thus in Cognitive Argumentation the form
of arguments and the relation between them will be context-dependent allowing for the ensuing
reasoning via argumentation to be context-sensitive, e.g. influencing which arguments to consider
and the intensity of the process of reasoning.
The methodological aim of Cognitive Argumentation is to study different cases of human rea-
soning in order to incrementally inform and extend the framework into an increasingly more gen-
eral cognitive model for human reasoning. The approach of Cognitive Argumentation has already
been applied and tested on one such example concerning how humans reason with Aristotelian
Syllogisms (Dietz Saldanha & Kakas, 2019). This is an important first case as in this humans are
asked to reason as close as possible to a formal setting and a cognitive model would need to match
together the formal and non-formal human reasoning that is observed to occur. Cognitive Argu-
mentation performs well in doing this as attested in the recent first Syllogism Challenge 2017.1
1.2 Study and Structure of Paper
In this paper, we will consider a second example of human reasoning, in a very different setting
from that of syllogistic reasoning, namely that of informal or common sense reasoning with ev-
eryday conditional information. The aim is to formulate within Cognitive Argumentation human
conditional reasoning and test this by examining how it can capture the experimental results of
1https://www.cc.uni-freiburg.de/modelingchallenge/challenge-2017
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the suppression task (Byrne, 1989; Dieussaert, Schaeken, Schroyens, & D’Ydewalle, 2000), in a
coherent and complete way. The larger aim is to use this study to probe more deeply the frame-
work of Cognitive Argumentation in order to understand more generally how to build and apply
this framework.
A large amount of literature exists that investigates the experimental results of the suppression
task, as well as some formal approaches that suggest how to model the task (e.g. (Stenning &
van Lambalgen, 2008; Dietz, Ho¨lldobler, & Ragni, 2012)). These works mostly concentrate on
understanding the suppression effect between the different groups. Yet, the results contain more
information. In particular, we can identify different kinds of majorities, ranging from close to
average to almost all participants. The experiment thus contains the additional challenge to provide
an explanation for the (significant) majorities and the variation of conclusions drawn amongst
them. We will see that this is indeed the case in Cognitive Argumentation, accounting not only
for the effect of suppression but also for these variations among the population participating in the
same groups.
The formal framework of Cognitive Argumentation will be presented in Section 4. This will
be defined as an instance of preference-based argumentation (Kakas, Mancarella, & Dung, 1994;
Garcı´a & Simari, 2004; Prakken & Sartor, 1997; Modgil & Prakken, 2013; Amgoud, Dimopou-
los, & Moraitis, 2008; Kakas & Moraitis, 2003), suitably adapted for the task of capturing human
logical reasoning, and whose acceptability semantics has the degree of flexibility needed for the
informal nature of human reasoning. After a brief introduction of the suppression task in Section 2,
we will analyze a set of relevant cognitive principles with particular attention to the cognitive links
between conditionals and argument schemes (Section 3). Section 5 presents an analysis of argu-
mentative reasoning of all cases of the suppression task and evaluates this in accordance with the
observed experimental data, accounting for the suppression effect and the signifigant variation of
individual responses in the same case. Section 6 introduces COGNICA, a web based system for
automating the process of human conditional reasoning through Cognitive Argumentation. The
paper ends with a general discussion of human reasoning via argumentation (Section 7), summa-
rizing the essential elements of this and the main challenges that lay ahead.
2 The Suppression Task
The suppression task (Byrne, 1989), is a well-known psychological study on human reasoning. The
experimental setting was as follows: Three groups of participants were asked to derive conclusions
4
given variations of a set of premises. Group I was given the following two premises:2
If she has an essay to finish, then she will study late in the library. (e; `)
She has an essay to finish. (e)
The participants were asked what necessarily had to follow assuming that the above two premises
were true. They could choose between the following three answer possibilities:3
She will study late in the library. (`)
She will not study late in the library. (`)
She may or may not study late in the library. (` or `)
In this first group, 96% of the participants concluded that She will study late in the library.
In addition to the above two premises for Group I, Group II was given the following premise:
If she has a textbook to read, then she will study late in the library. (t; `)
Still, 96% of the participants concluded that She will study late in the library. Finally, Group III
received, together with the two premises of Group I, additionally the following premise:
If the library stays open, then she will study late in the library. (o; `)
In this group only 38% concluded that She will study late in the library: The conclusion drawn in
the previous groups was suppressed in Group III.
The results of this experiment show that previously drawn conclusions seem to be suppressed
given (appropriate) additional information, i.e. participants seemed to reason non-monotonically
in a context-sensitive way. A natural explanation why participants in Group III did not conclude
necessarily that She will study late in the library, is because they were not sure whether The library
stays open, which is a necessary requirement for her to study late in the library. In the first two
groups the majority of the participants did not have this doubt, as they had not been made aware
of the possibility that the library may not be open.
In this paper, we will show how this experiment and its observed data can be naturally under-
stood by formalizing human reasoning in terms of building supporting arguments for conclusions
and defending such arguments against their counterarguments.
To reason in terms of argumentation, we can construct an argument based on e and e ; `,
which supports the conclusion `. In Groups I and II, the only argument that we can construct for `
2The participants received the natural language sentences but not the abbreviated notation on the right hand side.
3Here and in the sequel, we will denote with an overbar the negation or complement of an atomic statement, e.g. e
and ` denote the negation of e and the negation of `, respectively.
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Fact: e, e; `
Hyp: `
Hyp: `
Fact: e, e; ` Hyp: t, t; `
Hyp: `
Hyp: `
Fact: e, e; `
Hyp: o, o; `
Hyp: `
Hyp: `
Figure 1: Summary of the case where She has an essay to finish for group I (left), group II (middle) and
group III (right). The acceptable arguments are highlighted in gray.
consists of hypothesizing ` itself. This forms a counterargument to the above argument for `. But
according to a relative preference or strength of the explicitly stated premises, the argument of e and
e; `, can defend against `, but not vice-versa as ` is a weaker argument. The left graph in Figure 1
representing Group I, shows at the bottom this winning argument. To distinguish explicitly stated
premises not those not stated explicitly we will call the latter hypothetical premises denoting them
with a prefix of ‘Hyp’. At the top of the figure we see another argument supporting `, namely the
hypothesis of `. The figure shows how this is attacked by hypothesis argument for ` and that how `
can defend back against this as there is no preference (or strength) between these two hypotheses.
Given that the hypothesis argument for ` cannot defend against its counterargument, e and e; `,
we have a good quality, or acceptable as it is normally called in AI, argument for ` but not for `.
The middle part of Figure 1 shows the case for Group II where we can construct another
argument for ` based on the hypothesis of t and t ; `. In both groups, `, is the only statement
supported by acceptable arguments. This corresponds to the majority’s conclusion, that She will
study late in the library holds, i.e. that this is a definite conclusion.
For Group III, the case is different. The participants might have become aware of the common
sense knowledge that If the library does not stay open, then she will not (be able to) study late in
the library (o; `). This together with the possibility, or the hypothesis, that The library does not
stay open (o), gives an argument that supports the conclusion that `. Furthermore, it seems that
this argument is at least as preferred as the argument supporting ` based on e and e ; `. Hence
now we also have an argument for ` that is acceptable and those human participants that reason
with this argument are prevented from deriving that She will study late in the library as a definite
conclusion. For them, it is only a plausible conclusion. Figure 1 illustrates this in the right-most
part where although the same argument, e together with e; `, continues to defeat the hypothetical
argument for ` it does not defeat the argument built from o and o; `, as seen at the bottom of the
figure. Both these arguments can defend against each other and hence they are both acceptable.
In total, (Byrne, 1989) reported the experimental results of twelve cases of the suppression
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Group Conditional(s) Essay (e) No essay (e) Library (`) No library (`)
I e; ` library (96%) no library (46%) essay (71%) no essay (92%)
II e; `, t; ` library (96%) no library (4%) essay (13%) no essay (96%)
III e; `, o; ` library (38%) no library (63%) essay (54%) no essay (33%)
Table 1: Summary of the twelve cases and the corresponding suppression effects denoted in gray.
task. For each of the three groups, four different cases of reasoning were considered by combining
their general knowledge with one of the following factual information:
She has an essay to finish. (e)
She will study late in the library. (`)
She does not have an essay to finish. (e)
She will not study late in the library. (`)
Table 1 shows for each group (column 1), the conditional information they received (column 2)
together with the factual information for each of the four cases (column 3 to 6). In each row we
can see the percentage of responses by the participants in the group corresponding to the row of
the table. Those in gray are the responses demonstrating the suppression effect. The majority’s
responses in Group II diverges in two cases from the majority’s responses in Group I and III: When
participants received the information, that She does not have an essay to finish (e), only 4% con-
cluded that She will not study late in the library (`), and when they received the information that
She will study late in the library, only 13% concluded that She has an essay to finish. Contrary to
these cases, the suppression effect for Group III took place when participants received the infor-
mation that She has an essay to finish (only 38% concluded that She will study late in the library),
or when they were given the fact that She will not study late in the library (only 33% concluded
that She does not have an essay to finish.
We will use this experiment to motivate and test our model of Cognitive Argumentation for
human reasoning by examining how it can uniformly capture the experimental results in all twelve
cases accounting for the suppression effect as well as the variation of responses within each group.
3 Cognitive Principles
Humans make various (implicit) assumptions while reasoning, many of which are not necessarily
valid under (formal) classical logic. We will specify such (typically) extra-logical properties and
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formalize them as cognitive principles to help us develop a framework of argumentation that is in
tune with human reasoning.
3.1 Maxim of Quality
According to Grice’s (1975) conversational implicature, humans communicate according to a co-
operation principle. The maxim of quality states that humans try to be truthful and thus information
that we get in conversation is assumed to be true and trusted. In the context of the suppression task,
for example, this principle implies that what the experimenter states, e.g. She has an essay to finish
(e), is believed to be true by the participants: it is trusted as strong information that does not need
to be questioned or is questioned only in an extreme case.
Accordingly, we will establish a (strong) factual argument scheme to encompass this principle.
3.2 Maxim of Relevance
People consider different scenarios depending on whether they have been made aware of alter-
native options while reasoning (Sperber & Wilson, 1995; Byrne, 2005). This awareness may
not be through some direct and explicit mention of the alternative. Nevertheless, considering
Grice’s (1975) maxim of relevance, it seems natural to consider (and account) for the possibility of
these alternatives, as the participants might believe that, otherwise this information would not have
been mentioned, e.g. in a dialogue. We can capture this cognitive principle of considering different
awareness (or relevance) driven possibilities through a (weak) hypothesis argument scheme.
Hence for information that we are made aware of and not given explicitly as factual informa-
tion, people can still construct various context-dependent hypotheses supporting statements con-
cerning this information. As there is no direct evidence that these hypotheses hold, they are only
plausible, the hypothesis argument scheme is weaker than other argument schemes based on ex-
plicitly given information.
3.3 Conditional Reasoning
Byrne (2005) distinguishes between different types of conditionals and conditions, assumed to be
perceived by humans in situations like those of the selection task (Wason, 1968; Griggs & Cox,
1982) and the suppression task (Dietz Saldanha, Ho¨lldobler, & Rocha, 2017). We will extend
this distinction and propose canonical associations related to different types of conditions. In
particular, we will introduce and distinguish between prediction and explanatory associations and
related argument schemes.
Consider the following conditional:
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If I need milk, then I will buy milk. (need ; buy)
The condition I need milk can be understood as sufficient, in the sense that if the condition holds,
then this forms a support for the consequent, I will buy milk, to hold as well (modus ponens). On
the other hand, the negation of the condition, I don’t need milk, seems to be a plausible support for
the negation of the consequent, I will not buy milk (denying the antecedent). Thus the condition
can also be understood as necessary for the consequence to hold.
Consider now, additionally to (need ; buy), the following conditional:
If my mother asks me to get her milk, then I will buy milk. (asks ; buy)
Both conditions in (need ; buy) and (asks ; buy), which are independent of each other, are
separately sufficient in order for the consequence to hold. However, the negation of either of these
conditions alone is not enough to conclude the negation of the consequence, I will not buy milk.
Only the negation of both conditions together, gives sufficient support to conclude the negation
of the consequence. Therefore, individually the conditions in (need ; buy) and (asks ; buy)
are not necessary conditions. Now that there is a second way to bring about the consequent, the
condition I need milk has lost its necessary property.
Let us now assume that, in addition to (need ; buy) and (asks ; buy), we are also given the
following conditional:
If I have enough money, then I will buy milk. (money ; buy)
By this conditional (money ; buy) we are made aware of the possibility of a situation where,
even in the case where, I need milk or my mother asks me to get her milk, I might not buy milk,
because possibly I don’t have enough money. Having enough money is a necessary condition for
the consequent: without it the consequent cannot hold, i.e. I cannot buy milk, no matter what other
(sufficient) conditions might hold at the time. Also in comparison with the the above cases we
might consider this a strong necessary condition in the sense that it is more or very unlikely for
this to loose its necessary property. On the other hand, the condition of (money ; buy) cannot be
considered as a sufficient condition: even if I have enough money, I might not buy milk.
The distinction between the two different types of conditions, sufficient and necessary, shows
up when we consider explanations of the consequent and its negation. Assume that we are given
the information that
I did not buy milk. (buy)
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It is reasonable that, given (need ; buy) and (asks ; buy) (without (money ; buy)), to
conclude the negation of the condition of both conditionals, namely that I did not need milk and
my mother did not ask me to get her milk (modus tollens). Adding the conditional (money ; buy)
in the context of reasoning would not extend this conjunction but would result in a disjunctive
addition of the negation of the new (necessary) condition:
Either (I do not need milk and my mother does not ask me to get her milk)
or I do not have enough money.
Hence the observation of the negation of the consequent can be explained by the negation of a
necessary condition (e.g. I do not have enough money) or by assuming that there is “no reason” for
the consequent to hold, resulting in a more complex explanation, namely that none of the sufficient
conditions can hold.
In contrast, if we are given the positive information that a consequent holds, e.g. I buy milk,
then this can be simply explained by any one of the sufficient conditions for the consequent, e.g.
either by I need milk or by my mother asks me to get her milk (affirming the consequent). It is
important to note that typically we will not consider that two such sufficient conditions, together,
form an explanation. In fact, we typically consider that different explanations are incompatible
with each other, except perhaps in very exceptional cases where many different reasons can hold
together. Hence we will only accept one, either I need milk or my mother asks me to get her milk
to explain the consequent I buy milk but not both together. Similarly, when we are explaining the
negation of the consequent, e.g. I did not buy milk, we will only accept one of the explanations,
either I do not have enough money or there is “no reason”, i.e. I did not need milk and my mother
did not ask me to get her milk.
Hence different explanations are in general considered to be in tension with each other. They
are competing or contrasting alternatives as implied for example by the maxim of “Inference to the
best explanation” (see e.g. (Lipton, 2003; Ruben, 1990)). The process of explanation is not merely
to find why something holds but also why this is indeed the reason for holding and not for some
other reason. In (Kelley, 1973; Sloman, 1994) a cognitive principle of explanatory discounting
is identified which assumes that alternative explanations are in conflict with each other so that
support for one explanation results in diminishing support, thus countersupport, against alternative
explanations.
Human explanatory reasoning also follows a principle of simplicity by choosing simple expla-
nations depending on the context at hand. Hence even when a “logically complete” explanation
would contain a conjunction, such as the explanation of I did not need milk and my mother did not
ask me to get her milk, we would consider these conjuncts as separate explanations drawn from
the observation, depending on the context of reasoning. In one context, when we are buying milk
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for ourselves, we would explain not buying milk by I did not need milk and conclude this, without
necessarily also considering the explanation my mother did not ask me to get her milk.
Finally, we note that depending on the nature of the condition, sufficient or necessary, we can
draw conclusions in a secondary predictive mode from factual information about the consequent.
Observing the negation of the consequent can lead us to predictively conclude the negation of any
of its sufficient conditions. This can be seen as a “modus tollens” conclusion via Reductio ad
Absurdum based on the fact that when a sufficient condition holds its consequent also has to hold.
Furthermore, in some cases these conclusions can be the same as conclusions drawn in a secondary
explanatory mode by considering that the negation of a sufficient condition is an explanation of
the observed failure of the consequent to hold in the particular context in which we are reasoning.
On the other hand, observing that the consequent holds can lead us to predictively conclude
that a necessary condition holds, e.g. observing I buy milk, we can conclude that I have enough
money. This follows from the way a necessary condition is understood, i.e. I have enough money
must necessarily hold for the consequent to hold (affirming the consequent).
As discussed previously, cognitively, an explanation is required to discriminate between dif-
ferent possible alternatives. Howevever, a necessary condition cannot be considered as a possible
explanation for the consequent because it always holds and hence it does not offer any discrimina-
tory information. Prediction of several necessary conditions, as opposed to different explanations,
do not compete with each other (Fernbach, Darlow, & Sloman, 2010) and hence they can hold
together when we are given that the consequent holds.
Summarizing, we note that the interpretation of conditions within conditionals as sufficient
or necessary and the possible conclusions drawn either as predictions or explanations depends
on the context in which these are considered. This context-sensitive nature of interpretation and
reasoning can vary among the population, depending on the background knowledge of conditionals
that each individual has or that is made aware of in a scenario of discourse.
3.4 Canonical Associations of Condition and Consequence
We will now establish canonical associations of different types of conditions with respect to pre-
dictions and explanations, which in turn will correspond to argument schemes that will form the
basis for the argumentative reasoning. Consider a condition and a consequence coming from some
conditional: “if condition then consequence”.
We establish the following rule associations4 between a condition and a consequent:
4Associations are written with; instead of→ to emphasize their defeasible nature.
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Type Applicable Principle Abbrev Given Fact
cond cond consq consq
suff sufficient prediction (suff p) consq - - -
sufficient explanation (suff e) - - cond -
sec. sufficient prediction (sec suff p) - - - cond
sec. sufficient explanation (sec suff e) - - - cond
necc necessary prediction (necc p) - consq - -
sec. neccessary prediction (sec necc p) - - cond -
necessary explanation (necc e) - - - cond
exogenous explanation (exo e) - - exo(consq) exo(consq)
Table 2: Predictions and explanations from factual information depending on the type of condition.
1. Predictions: The canonical predictive association for a sufficient condition:
cond; consq (suff p)
The canonical predictive association for a necessary condition:
cond; consq (necc p)
2. Explanations: The canonical explanatory association for a necessary condition:
consq; cond (necc e)
The canonical explanatory association for a sufficient condition:
consq; cond (suff e)
Note that these explanatory associations are the reverse of the predictive ones.
3. Secondary Associations:
(a) Secondary Predictions: The secondary association (which corresponds to the contra-
positive of the prediction association) for a sufficient condition, is:
consq; cond (sec suff p)
The secondary association for a necessary condition is:
consq; cond (sec necc p)
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(b) Secondary Explanations: The secondary explanatory association for a sufficient con-
dition is:
consq; cond (sec suff e)
(c) Exogenous Explanations: Psychological experiments (e.g. (Fernbach, Darlow, & Slo-
man, 2010)) show that humans are sometimes likely to come up with alternative causes
that are not appearing within the given context. These exogenous explanations can
be captured via associations which link the consequent (positive or negative) with an
exogenous explanation (represented by exo(consq) and exo(consq) respectively).
consq; exo(consq) and consq; exo(consq) (exo e)
4. Strength of Associations: Predictive associations from necessary conditions (necc p) are
stronger than conflicting associations from sufficient conditions (suff p). This reflects the
strength of a pragmatic disabling condition over a motivational enabling condition for the
same consequent.
5. Incompatibility: Explanatory associations are typically incompatibly exclusive. For exam-
ple, if there is more than one explanatory sufficient condition for the consequence then they
are incompatible with each other and of equal strength. Table 3 provides a summary of the
(in)compatibility of explanations. Note that exogenous explanations are by their nature in
conflict with other explanations: people introduce them only when they are in doubt about
other explanations.
Following the discussion above, Table 2 gives a summary of the condition types together with
their canonical predictions and explanations with respect to the given facts. It is important to note
that these canonical predictions and explanations are not meant to necessarily represent definite
conclusions but rather that they are plausible conclusions that are cognitively admissible in human
reasoning.
Table 4 shows, as an example, the canonical associations that apply for the suppression task.
For the cases of Group I and III the condition She has an essay to finish can be interpreted both as
sufficient and necessary. For some part of the population this may only be a sufficient condition
in which case the associations shown in parentheses in the columns for Groups I and III will not
apply. In Group II, She has an essay to finish is no longer considered as necessary due to the
presence of a second sufficient condition of She has a textbook to read. They are both considered
in the whole population of Group II only as sufficient conditions.
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Observation (In)compatibility of explanations
consq Explanations from sufficient conditions mutually incompatible
consq Explanations from sufficient conditions mutually compatible
consq Explanations from necessary conditions mutually incompatible
Also incompatible with explanations from sufficient conditions
consq Exogenous explanation incompatible with any other explanation
consq Exogenous explanation incompatible with any other explanation
Table 3: Overview of the (in)compatibility of explanations given the observation.
Group I Group II Group III
(suff p) e; ` e; `, t; ` e; `
(necc p) (e; `) o; `, (e; `)
(sec necc p) (`; e) (`; e), `; o
(sec suff p) `; e `; e, `; t `; e
(suff e) `; e `; e, `; t `; e
(necc e) (`; e) (`; e), `; o
(sec suff e) `; e `; e, `; t `; e
(exo e) `; exo(`), `; exo(`) `; exo(`), `; exo(`) `; exo(`), `; exo(`)
Table 4: Classification of the conditions of the conditionals of the suppression task.
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4 Cognitive Argumentation
We will now define the formal framework of Cognitive Argumentation for human reasoning. This
framework will encompass the conditional associations and other cognitive principles as argument
schemes together with their strength relation. It will be based on the standard framework of abstract
argumentation in AI, (Dung, 1995), as realized in preference based structured argumentation (see
e.g. (Kakas et al., 1994; Prakken & Sartor, 1997; Kakas & Moraitis, 2003; Modgil & Prakken,
2013)). Before presenting its technical definition we will first summarize, informally, its essential
elements and how logical reasoning is realized through argumentation.
4.1 Reasoning via Argumentation
In argumentation the essential and general structure of knowledge is an argument scheme: a struc-
ture that simply associates or links two pieces of information, the premises with the claim or
position of the scheme. Arguments are built from (argument) schemes, and support the corre-
sponding particular instances of the positions of these schemes. Then reasoning in argumentation
is a process of analysis of alternatives, e.g. a conclusion and its negation, by a consideration of
different arguments for and against the various competing alternatives. In comparison with other
classical logical approaches, reasoning via argumentation is an explicit process of examining the
alternatives either at the level of the final conclusion we are interested in or at the level of other
information, e.g. premises of arguments, that support the alternative possible conclusions.
More concretely, in a framework of argumentation-based reasoning the essential structural el-
ements are, the argument schemes, a notion of relative conflict and a notion of relative strength
between argument schemes and thus between arguments formed from them. Reasoning is then a
process of dialectic argumentation where starting from an argument supporting a position of inter-
est we consider arguments that, under the comparative conflict relation, compete, e.g. arguments
supporting incompatible positions, and examine how we can defend against such counterarguments
through arguments which are stronger or at least not weaker than the counterarguments.
Arguments that can defend themselves against their counterarguments are called acceptable
and the positions that they support are plausible conclusions. When in addition no such acceptable
argument can be constructed for the complement of a position then this forms a definite conclusion.
Definite conclusions correspond to logical conclusions in formal systems of logic: they are certain
and undisputed. On the other hand, plausible conclusions are useful in informal human reasoning
indicating the possibility of holding. We can therefore notice that in its general form, reasoning via
argumentation is close to model construction, similar as in mental model theory (Johnson-Laird,
1980; Johnson-Laird, V.Girotto, & P.Legrenzi, 2004).
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Any framework for human reasoning when placed into practise needs to be influenced by other,
possibly extra-logical, factors that play a significant role in the reasoning process by giving it a
cognitive form. In computational terms we can think of this as cognitive-based heuristics that
humans have learned to use to make their reasoning effective. Examples of such extra-logical
factors that govern the shape of human reasoning when this is understood via argumentation are:
awareness of the relevant argument schemes in the current context of reasoning, recognition and
selection of relatively strong arguments and the bounded application of the dialectic process by
concentrating only on some of the possible counterarguments. The challenge is to apply the process
of dialectic argumentation in a dynamic and context-sensitive way that focuses on the parts of the
knowledge pertinent to the reasoning task at hand.
4.2 Argumentation Logic Framework
Within the formal argumentation logic framework, the atomic statements in natural language can
be represented as propositional variables.5 Given a propositional logical language, L, the set of
propositional variables in L is denoted by PL. For the “milk example” of Section 3.4, Pmilk ,
consists of variables representing I need milk, I will buy milk, My mother asks me to get her milk
and I have enough money, as follows:
Pmilk = {need , asks , buy , money}.
The negation of PL, is denoted by ¬PL = {x | x ∈ P}, where x = ¬x. In general, L = ¬A if
L = A and L = A if L = ¬A. Accordingly, the negation of Pmilk is given by:
¬Pmilk = {need , asks , buy , money}.
We will be interested in reasoning within a cognitive state S = (F ,A) where, F , is a set of facts
and A is an awareness set. Both these elements of a cognitive state are linked to the environment
of the reasoner, the first consisting of explicit factual information that the environment provides
while the second consists of the concepts that the reasoner is made aware of by the environment.
We have F ⊆ (PL ∪ ¬PL) and A ⊆ PL. Note that the awareness of concepts in A does not
necessarily mean that we are aware whether they hold or not but simply that they and knowledge
about them might be relevant to the reasoning at hand. Also any concept for which we have a fact
in F belongs to A, i.e. if A ∈ F or A ∈ F , then A ∈ A.
Given a propositional language, L, an argumentation logic framework is a triple AL =
〈As, C,〉 where As is a set of argument schemes, C is a conflict relation on As, typically in-
duced by the notion of conflict in the language L, and  is a binary strength relation on As. An
5For simplicity of presentation we will only consider propositional argumentation frameworks.
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(argument) scheme, as ∈ As, is a tuple of the form as = (pre, pos) where precondition pre and
position pos are (sets of) statements in the language L. For instance, an argument scheme will link
subsets of propositional variables, i.e. pre, pos ⊆ (PL ∪ ¬PL).
Argument schemes were introduced as stereotypical reasoning patterns that are typically non-
deductive and non-monotonic (Pollock, 1995; Walton, 1996). In general, they allow us to link the
information in pre with that of pos. Usually argument schemes are parametric so that a scheme
can be applied for different values of its parameters to give or to construct arguments. We normally
say that pre are the premises on which the position pos is supported by an argument constructed
through the scheme as = (pre, pos). We will use argument schemes to capture the canonical
associations motivated by the cognitive principles in Section 3.
Recall the principle of Maxim of Quality in Section 3.1, under which what is given as premise
(e.g. by the experimenter), is taken to hold. Accordingly, we introduce the following fact scheme:
fact(L) = (∅, L) ∈ As if L ∈ F .
Given the requirement that L needs to be in F , the fact scheme is only applicable when indeed L
is a fact in the cognitive state. Similarly, for the principle of Maxim of Relevance in Section 3.2,
where everything we are made aware of, can possibly hold or not, we introduce a corresponding
hypothesis scheme as follows:
hyp(A) = (∅, A) ∈ As and hyp(A) = (∅, A) ∈ As if A ∈ A.
Here we require that the concept referred to in A or A needs to appear in the awareness set in order
for the argument scheme to be applicable: once we are aware of a concept we can hypothesize that
it holds or that it does not hold.
In Section 3.4 we have presented how humans consider different types of conditions in relation
to a consequent of interest and thus different associations between them. The canonical prediction
and explanation associations as summarized in Table 2, are straightforwardly represented by the
following argument schemes:
suff p = (cond, consq) suff e = (consq, cond)
sec suff p = (consq, cond) sec suff e = (consq, cond)
necc p = (cond, consq) necc e = (consq, cond)
sec necc p = (consq, cond) exo e(consq) = (consq, exo(consq))
exo e(consq) = (consq, exo(consq))
Depending on the given conditionals and their type of condition, the respective schemes will be in
As, and applicable for the construction of arguments.
Consider the milk example from Section 3.4: For the two conditionals with sufficient condition
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(need ; buy) and (asks ; buy)
the following two prediction schemes apply:
suff p(need ; buy)=(need , buy) and suff p(asks ; buy)=(asks , buy).
For the conditional with the necessary condition,
(money ; buy)
where I have enough money is a necessary condition for I will buy milk, and thus, if I don’t have
enough money, then I will not buy milk, the following prediction scheme applies:
necc p(money ; buy) = (money , buy)
We also have explanation schemes from the explanation associations, e.g.:
suff e(buy ; need)=(buy , need) necc e(buy ; money) =(buy ,money).
These schemes are parametric on the propositional variables of the given language in which the
various conditions and consequences are expressed. By choosing a set of values for the parameters
we say that we apply the argument scheme to construct an individual argument. An argument ∆,
is any (non-empty) set of individual arguments.
Let us now formalize how an argument supports a position (claim or conclusion). Given a
cognitive state S = (F ,A), an individual argument a supports L iff a = fact(L) or a = hyp(L).
More generally, given a cognitive state S = (F ,A), an argument ∆ supports L iff either
1. there is an individual argument, a ∈ ∆, such that a supports L, or
2. there is an individual argument a = ({L1, . . . , Lk}, pos) ∈ ∆, such that L ∈ pos and there
are a1, . . . , ak ∈ ∆ such that {a1, . . . , ak} supports each one of L1, . . . , Lk.
We will say that ∆ minimally supports L iff there is no ∆′ ⊂ ∆ such that ∆′ supports L.
Reasoning to a conclusion within an argumentation logic framework is based on considering
arguments that support the conclusion and other related statements (e.g. that support the premises
of a conclusion). It is important to note that the base case of the above definition of support has
as a consequence that the argumentative reasoning is strongly grounded on the current cognitive
state of the reasoner. All arguments need to eventually be based on information that comes from
the cognitive state. Then as the cognitive state changes the relevant arguments can change.
Consider again the above example with S ′ = (F ′,A′) = ({need}, {need , asks , buy , money}).
We can construct the argument
∆needneed;buy = {fact(need), suff p(need ; buy)},
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that supports the position that I will buy milk (buy). Note that the fact scheme
fact(need) = (∅, need),
is grounded in the above specified state S ′ because need ∈ F , which in turn, is the premise of
suff p(need ; buy), that supports buy .
4.3 Attack and Defense between Arguments
The last two elements of an argumentation logic framework, AL = 〈As, C,〉, are used to define
the notions of attack and defense amongst arguments, on which we build the semantics of good
quality or acceptable arguments then the semantics of argumentation based reasoning.
The second element in AL = 〈As, C,〉, C, denotes a conflict relation which is used to spec-
ify when arguments conflict with each other. The conflict relation is typically based on a conflict
relation defined in the language, L, of the argumentation framework expressing which type of
statements are in (direct) conflict with each other. Hence when arguments support conflicting po-
sitions then they are in conflict with each other and we say that they form a counter argument of
each other. The conflict relation can also contain elements expressing explicitly that two individual
arguments are in conflict because the argument schemes that they are based on cannot be applied
together. Arguments are required to be conflict-free, i.e. they cannot support simultaneously con-
flicting positions, e.g. both L and L, or contain schemes that are explicitly in conflict.
The conflict relation defines directly the notion of attack between two arguments: an argument,
∆′ attacks or is a counterargument of another argument, ∆, iff there exists an L, such that ∆
supports L and ∆′ supports L, or they contain individual arguments whose argument schemes are
in conflict.
To illustrate these notions, let us assume that we are given the current state
S ′′ = (F ′′,A′′) = ({need ,money}, {need , asks , buy , money}),
i.e. we are given the (factual) information, that I need milk and I do not have enough money.
Together with the argument, ∆needneed;buy , that we considered above and which supports buy , we can
also construct another argument
∆money
money;buy
= {fact(money), necc p(money ; buy)},
which supports buy . Note that this argument is grounded in S ′′, because fact(money) is grounded
in F . As buy and buy are in conflict with each other, these two arguments form counterarguments
for each other.
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The third element in AL = 〈As, C,〉, , is a binary strength relation among the argument
schemes. This relation is required to be strongly non reflexive, i.e. it does not specify any argu-
ment scheme as stronger than itself. Informally, it is meant to capture the relative strength among
argument schemes: Given two argument schemes as and as′, as  as′ means as is stronger than
as′. In the following, we will assume, as is typically the case, that schemes are only comparable to
each other, when they are in conflict, i.e. they support opposing positions or their schemes are in
conflict.
Recall the discussion in Section 3.4: (money ; buy) blocks a possible prediction of (need ;
buy), because If I do not have enough money, then I can not buy milk even if If I need milk.
We therefore assumed a cognitive principle where the associations from necessary conditions are
stronger. This is captured by:
necc p(money ; buy)  suff p(need ; buy).
If this is the only strength relation defined on the individual arguments occurring in ∆money
money;buy
and
∆needneed;buy , then we will consider ∆
money
money;buy
as a stronger argument than ∆needneed;buy , in the sense
that ∆money
money;buy
contains an individual argument that is stronger than some individual argument in
∆needneed;buy but not vice versa.
Following the discussion in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, factual schemes are stronger than any
other (opposing) scheme, and hypotheses schemes are weaker than any other (opposing) scheme.
For the running example, the strength of facts principle gives us (among others), the following
relations:
fact(buy)  necc p(money ; buy), fact(buy)  hyp(buy),
fact(buy)  suff p(need ; buy), fact(buy)  hyp(buy).
The notion of defense between arguments is similar to that of attack, but where now we addi-
tionally require that, informally, the defending argument is not of lower strength than the argument
it is defending against. In other words, for an argument ∆ to defend against ∆′, ∆ must be stronger
than ∆′ or at least of the same strength.
Formally, given 〈As, C,〉, an argument ∆ defends against another argument ∆′ iff there
exists an L and ∆min ⊆ ∆, ∆′min ⊆ ∆′ such that
1. ∆min, ∆′min minimally support L, L respectively, or
∆min, ∆′min minimally support the claim of an argument a ∈ ∆min , a′ ∈ ∆′min respectively,
such that (the argument schemes) a and a′ are in conflict, and
2. if there exists a′ ∈ ∆′min, a ∈ ∆min such that a′  a then
there exists b ∈ ∆min, b′ ∈ ∆′min, such that b  b′.
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In this definition, the first condition simply requires that ∆ is in conflict with ∆′ while the
second condition uses the strength relation on the individual arguments to lift this to a strength
relation on sets of individual arguments. The particular way that this lifting is done can vary in
different argumentation frameworks. Here we adopt a specific choice of this based on a “weakest
link” principle that gives a liberal form of defense.6 It says that if an argument ∆ contains at
least one individual argument which is stronger than an individual argument in another conflicting
argument ∆′ then ∆ can defend against ∆′. Otherwise, ∆ can only defend against ∆′ if ∆ does not
contain any weaker individual elements, i.e. that the individual arguments in the two arguments
are non-comparable under the strength relation. In the milk example above, given S ′′, ∆money
money;buy
defends against ∆needneed;buy , but not vice versa.
4.4 Acceptability of Arguments and Conclusions
We are now ready to give the formal notion of good quality or acceptable arguments and using this
to formulate an argumentation-based form of reasoning.
Informally, an acceptable argument is one that can defend against all its counterarguments.
Formally, given an argumentation logic framework, AL = 〈As, C,〉, and a cognitive state S =
(F ,A), an argument ∆ is acceptable or admissible inAL(S) iff ∆ is conflict-free and ∆ defends
against all arguments attacking ∆. A statement, L, is acceptable or a credulous conclusion
ofAL(S), iff there exists an acceptable argument ∆ inAL(S) that supports L. Furthermore, L is a
skeptical conclusion of AL(S) iff L is a credulous conclusion of AL(S), and L is not a credulous
conclusion of AL(S), i.e. there is no acceptable argument supporting L.
Credulous and skeptical conclusions represent plausible or possible and definite or certain
conclusions, respectively. The existence of an acceptable argument supporting a conclusion makes
this only a possible conclusion: there is a good reason to conclude this but there could also be just
as good reasons to conclude something contrary to it and thus we cannot be certain or definite in
our conclusion. Only when such possibilities of the contrary do not exist then we can have a high
confidence in a definite conclusion.
Let us consider again the cognitive state S ′′ and the arguments ∆money
money;buy
and ∆needneed;buy :
∆money
money;buy
(minimally) supports buy and ∆needneed;buy (minimally) supports buy .
There is an individual argument in ∆money
money;buy
, namely necc p(money ; buy), which is stronger
than an argument in ∆needneed;buy , namely suff p(need ; buy), but not vice versa. Therefore,
6This choice has been proven useful in a variety of different problems in AI that were studied under the particular
GORGIAS preference based argumentation framework (Kakas et al., 1994; Kakas, Moraitis, & Spanoudakis, 2019)
on which we are more particularly basing our framework of Cognitive Argumentation.
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∆money
money;buy
defends against ∆needneed;buy , but not vice versa. Accordingly, buy is acceptable but buy
is not acceptable in Amilk(S ′′). Therefore buy is a skeptical or definite conclusion of Amilk(S ′′).
Note that technically an acceptable argument ∆ for a conclusion L may need to contain ar-
guments to defend against counterarguments on the subset of ∆ that minimally supports L. To
illustrate this, consider again S ′, which is similar to S ′′, but does not contain the fact money . Note
that ∆needneed;buy would not be acceptable by itself. The argument:
∆
money
n
;buy
= {hyp(money), necc p(money ; buy)},
forms an attack against which ∆needneed;buy cannot defend against by itself (because ∆
need
need;buy does
not contain any individual argument that is stronger than some individual argument in ∆
money
n
;buy
).
However,
∆needneed;buy,m = ∆
need
need;buy ∪ {hyp(money)}
is an acceptable argument (for buy) because ∆needneed;buy,m defends against ∆money n;buy by defend-
ing against the conclusion money of ∆
money
n
;buy
since the individual arguments hyp(money) and
hyp(money) are of equal strength under .
4.5 Dialectic Argumentation Process
The semantics of acceptable arguments, as defined above, affords a natural and simple dialectic
argumentation process for constructing such arguments.7 We will describe here, informally, this
process and briefly point out its important links to cognitive argumentation.
The basic steps are as follows:
Step 1 construct a root argument supporting a conclusion of interest,
Step 2 consider a counterargument against the root argument,
Step 3 find a defense argument against the counterargument,
Step 4 check that this defense argument is not in conflict with the root argument,
Step 5 add this defense argument to the root argument,
Repeat from Step 2, i.e. consider another counterargument to the now extended root argument.
7This process has been studied extensively in the literature of argumentation in AI (see e.g. (Dung, Kowalski, &
Toni, 2006; Kakas & Toni, 1999)).
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This is a form of a debate between supporting a position and trying to defeat it. Carrying
out the process until there are no other counterarguments in Step 2 that have not already being
considered, clearly results in an extended root argument that is an acceptable argument supporting
the conclusion of interest.
Let us illustrate the dialectic argumentation process with the running example, where the cog-
nitive state is S ′ (as above). The position of interest is buy . In Step 1 we construct a root argument,
∆needneed;buy = {fact(need), suff p(need ; buy)}, supporting buy .
In Step 2, we check whether there are counterarguments against this argument. We can construct
the following counterargument:
∆
money
n
;buy
= {hyp(money), necc p(money ; buy)},
which is grounded in S ′, because money ∈ A′. Can we find (Step 3) a defense against ∆
money
n
;buy
?
Note that ∆needneed;buy cannot itself defend against ∆money n;buy , as shown in the end of Section 4.4.
Nevertheless, a defense is given by the hypothesis argument hyp(money) = (∅,money), which
we can add (Step 4 and Step 5) to ∆needneed;buy .
This new extended argument is denoted as ∆needneed;buy,m. Returning to Step 2 we look for other
counterarguments. Such a counterargument is given by the hypothesis argument, hyp(buy) =
(∅, buy), which is trivially defended against with the root argument, ∆needneed;buy . In other words,
there is no need to find a different defense argument and extend further the current the root argu-
ment in Step 1.
The dialectic argumentation process for constructing acceptable arguments can be given a tree
structure. This can be illustrated by figures that show how the various arguments attack and defend
each other. On the left of Figure 2, the above example is shown. On the right of Figure 2 the
same process for the non-acceptability of ∆needneed;buy is shown given S ′′, i.e. when money ∈ F ′′.
Here and in the following figures, (temporarily) acceptable arguments are highlighted in gray and
non-acceptable arguments are in white. ↑ shows attacks and/or weak defenses, i.e. defenses that
are also defended against by the argument they are defending against. ⇑ shows strong defenses,
i.e. defenses that cannot be defended against by the argument they are defending against. In many
cases these strong defenses determine the (final) acceptability of arguments.
Although the description of the dialectic argumentation process is relatively simple one can
easily notice that it is computationally intensive. This is because in all the main steps, Step 1,
Step 2 and Step 3 a choice is required. What guides these choices? In particular, within the
context of Cognitive Argumentation what cognitive principles can be used to control the process?
For instance, in Step 1, where we construct the initial root argument, it seems natural to choose
relatively strong arguments first, i.e. the ones based on facts rather than hypotheses. People would
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∆needneed;buy
Step (1)
∆needneed;buy
∆
money
n
;buy
Step (2)
∆
money
n
;buy
∆needneed;buy
{hyp(money)}
Step (3, 4)
{hyp(buy)}
∆needneed;buy∪
{hyp(money)}
∆needneed;buy
5, repeat Step (2)
∆needneed;buy
Step (1)
∆needneed;buy
∆money
money;buy
Step (2)
Figure 2: Dialectic argumentation process showing that buy is an acceptable conclusion given S ′ =
({need}, {need , asks, buy , money}) (left) and showing that buy is not an acceptable conclusion given
S ′′ = ({need ,money}, {need , asks, buy , money}) (right).
not start by making hypotheses, when they can choose other stronger supporting arguments based
on factual information. In Step 2, it is important to note that we only need to consider attacks that
are strictly stronger than the root argument, avoiding to consider weaker arguments as attacks as
these are already defendable by the root argument. In Step 3, like in Step 1, we would have a
preference to choose strong defenses thus minimizing the extra counterattacks that we would have
to consider when we extend in Step 5 the root argument by the defense argument.
A thorough analysis and study of this second group of cognitive principles that are directly
related to the argumentative reasoning process is outside the scope of the present paper.
5 The Suppression Task
We are now ready to apply the framework of Cognitive Argumentation to the suppression task. To
start with we need to construct the argumentation logic framework, 〈As, C,〉, with the (argument)
schemes, As, that are relevant to the knowledge that participants have in the suppression task.
Table 5 gives an overview of these schemes showing how they are motivated by the cognitive
principles as introduced in the previous Sections 3 and 4. Note that the factual scheme is only
shown for the properties e and ` as this is sufficient for the experimental setup (where the partic-
ipants are only given facts on these two properties) whereas the hypothesis argument scheme can
be applied on any property in the language used in the experiment.
Motivated by the observations in Section 3, the preference or strength relation, , among these
schemes in 〈As, C,〉, is specified as follows:
1. Fact schemes are stronger than any other conflicting scheme.
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2. Hypotheses schemes are weaker than any other conflicting scheme.
3. Prediction schemes established from necessary conditions (necc p schemes), are stronger
than conflicting schemes established from sufficient conditions (suff p schemes).
The third part of this strength relation, as discussed before, reflects the strength of a pragmatic
disabling condition over a motivational enabling condition for the same consequent.
We are left to give the middle component, C of the realization of the cognitive argumentation
framework, 〈As, C,〉, for the suppression task. This conflict relation, C, is defined through the
complement relation of negation in the propositional language of the suppression task. Hence
schemes (and arguments constructed from them) which support complementary positions are in
conflict with each other (and hence the corresponding arguments form counterarguments of each
other). In addition, we consider a second element of the conflict relation that explanation schemes
with the same premises but different position can be in conflict with each other, following the
general Table 3 in Section 3.4.
For example, suff e(`; e) and necc e(`; o) are in conflict with each other as they produce
different explanations for the same observation ` (i.e. She did not study late in the library.) On
the other hand, suff e(` ; e) and suff e(` ; t) are not in conflict with each other. Rather,
both e and t form constituents parts of an explanation for `. Table 6 provides an overview of the
(in)compatibility of the explanatory schemes of the suppression task, according to Table 3.
Finally, we note that the cognitive state, S = (F ,A), for each group depends on what is
factually stated in the experiment and what the participants in each different group are made aware
of, as presented in Section 3.2. Hence for example, for Group I the awareness set is A = {e, `},
whereas for Group II A = {e, `, t}, and for Group III, A = {e, `, o}. These sets determine which
schemes can be applied within the dialectic argumentation process.
5.1 Cognitive Adequacy for the Suppression Task Data
Participants were asked to select between three alternatives about a (natural language) statement
L: (i) L holds, (ii) L does not hold and (iii) L may or L may not hold. We can see that the first two
options refer to a definite conclusion for or against L, while the third option refers to a plausible
conclusion about L or its complement. It is thus important to note that the experimental conditions
encourage the participants to think and reason both about definite and plausible conclusions. What
is then a suitable evaluation method of a theoretical model for capturing the experimental data that
evaluates the cognitive adequacy of the model?
Given that Cognitive Argumentation contains both forms of definite and plausible conclusions,
this allows us to set up a criterion of evaluation of the cognitive adequacy that can probe deeply
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Name Scheme Cognitive Principle Sect
fact(e) (∅, e) maxim of quality 3.1
fact(e) (∅, e) maxim of quality 3.1
fact(`) (∅, ` maxim of quality 3.1
fact(`) (∅, `) maxim of quality 3.1
hyp(o) (∅, o) maxim of relevance 3.2
hyp(o) (∅, o) maxim of relevance 3.2
hyp(t) (∅, t) maxim of relevance 3.2
hyp(t) (∅, t) maxim of relevance 3.2
hyp(e) (∅, e) maxim of relevance 3.2
hyp(e) (∅, e) maxim of relevance 3.2
hyp(`) (∅, `) maxim of relevance 3.2
hyp(`) (∅, `) maxim of relevance 3.2
suff p(e; `) (e, `) sufficient prediction 3.4.1
suff p(t; `) (t, `) sufficient prediction 3.4.1
necc p(o; `) (o, `) necessary prediction 3.4.1
necc p(e; `) (e, `) necessary prediction 3.4.1
suff e(`; t) (`, t) sufficient explanation 3.4.2
suff e(`; e) (`, e) sufficient explanation 3.4.2
necc e(`; e) (`, e) necessary explanation 3.4.2
necc e(`; o) (`, o) necessary explanation 3.4.2
sec suff p(`; e) (`, e) secondary sufficient prediction 3.4.3a
sec suff p(`; t) (`, t) secondary sufficient prediction 3.4.3a
sec necc p(`; o) (`, o) secondary neccessary prediction 3.4.3a
sec necc p(`; e) (`, e) secondary neccessary prediction 3.4.3a
sec suff e(`; e) (`, e) secondary sufficient explanation 3.4.3b
sec suff e(`; t) (`, t) secondary sufficient explanation 3.4.3b
exo e(L) (L, exo(L)) exogenous explanation 3.4.3c
Table 5: Overview of the schemes motivated by the cognitive principles introduced in Section 3.
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Observation (In)compatibility of explanations
` suff e(`; e) and suff e(`; t) are incompatible
` sec suff e(`; e) and sec suff e(`; t) are compatible,
but incompatible with necc e(`; e) and necc e(`; o)
` necc e(`; e) and necc e(`; o) are incompatible,
also incompatible with sec suff e(`; e) and sec suff e(`; t)
` exo(`) is incompatible with any other explanation for `
` exo(`) is incompatible with any other explanation for `
Table 6: (In)compatibility of explanatory schemes depending on the observation and the type of condition.
the reasoning of the approach. This criterion will be based on comparing the percentage of the
participants’ responses for a position (e.g. for She will study late in the library (`)) with the
existence of acceptable arguments for the position that is asked and the existence of acceptable
arguments for its complement. In particular, we will examine if in each case of the experiment:
(i) there is an acceptable argument for that position asked but not for its negation (i.e. we have a
skeptical definite conclusion), or whether (ii) there is an acceptable argument for that position and
for the negation of that position (i.e. we have a credulous plausible conclusion).
This distinction will then be required to qualitatively correspond to variations in the observed
percentage of answers within the population across the three groups but also the variation within
each group as follows:
1. If the population agrees on a position overwhelmingly (> 90%), then the position asked
should follow in a skeptical, definite way.
2. If there is no overwhelming majority, i.e. the percentage of the population answering for the
position is less that 90%, then there should exist acceptable arguments for both the position
and its negation, i.e. they both should follow credulously.
The second case (2.) reflects the fact that when there is no clear majority for the position asked,
there are significant parts within the population, that believe the possibility of the opposite. In other
words, although these participants may be able to build acceptable arguments for the position asked
(just like those participants that have answered the question in a definite way) they also recognize
the possibility of the complement of the position holding, by being able to also build an acceptable
argument for the complement. As not the percentages of all answers were reported, but only
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the percentages of the answer in question, we cannot conclude that the participants who did not
chose for the answer in question, were prevented from choosing any answer in a definite way. Even
though unlikely, it is possible that these participants chose (skeptically) for the complement answer
(ignoring the counterarguments).
We will now show in each of the four cases of the experiment (where different factual infor-
mation is given to participants in all three groups) how we can capture, within this framework of
cognitive argumentation, the reported experimental results. Each of the four cases will be presented
in a separate subsection. In these we will introduce the main arguments that can be constructed for
and against the property that is asked and show which ones are acceptable by analyzing the relevant
dialectic argumentation processes. These will be illustrated by figures that show how the various
arguments attack and defend each other, following the definitions introduced in Section 4.5.
On Labeling Arguments, Schemes, Attacks and Acceptability In the sequel, we will use su-
perscripts and subscripts in the name of an argument, ∆, to indicate the scheme types applied
for the construction of the argument: Superscripts denote fact schemes (if applicable), whereas
subscripts will denote all other schemes. A (curly) arrow used as a subscript will indicate the as-
sociation captured by an argument scheme. Arrows are labeled by s; referring to schemes based
on a sufficient condition, or as n; referring to schemes based on a necessary condition.
For the figures, the interpretation of arrows and acceptability is as in Section 4.5: Accept-
able arguments are highlighted in gray and non-acceptable arguments stay white. ↑ shows attacks
and/or weak defenses, i.e. arguments which can also be defended against by the argument they
are attacking or defending against. ⇑ shows strong attacks and/or defenses, i.e. arguments which
cannot be defended against by the argument they are attacking or defending against.
5.2 She has an essay to finish
In the first case all three groups were given the factual information, She has an essay to finish
(e), and were asked whether She will study late in the library (`). In Group I, participants were
assumed to be only aware of e and ` as no other property is involved in the conditional information
or question that they were given. Thus, the cognitive state that represents this group of participants
is S = ({e}, {e, `}).
Figure 3 gives step-by-step the dialectic construction of the main (i.e. stronger and more cogni-
tively plausible) arguments for ` and ` in Group I. 8 The (strongest) argument supporting ` is given
8In this figure and the following ones, the numbers in parentheses below the graphs refer to the steps in the dialectic
argumentation process as specified in Section 4.5. (1, . . . ) denotes for which position the argument is being constructed
in step 1.
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Figure 3: Construction for ` (left) and for ` (right) in Group I given e.
by combining the fact scheme for e together with the sufficient prediction scheme for ` (Figure 3.1,
`):
∆e
e
s
;`
= {fact(e), suff p(e; `)}.
It is easy to recognize this as a modus ponens argument expressed here in an argumentation per-
spective. For supporting ` the main argument is constructed by applying the necessary prediction
scheme for ` with the hypothesis scheme for e (Figure 3.1, `):
∆
e,e
n
;`
= {hyp(e), necc p(e; `)}.
These two arguments attack each other but as the figures show only ∆e
e
s
;`
is able to defend against
the attack via the argument ∆e = {fact(e)} that it contains. In fact, ∆
e,e
n
;`
is immediately defeated
by the stronger argument ∆e which attacks ∆
e,e
n
;`
on the hypothesis part it contains and for which
there is no defense. Consequently, ` is an acceptable (plausible) conclusion whereas ` is not.
Combining the two results for ` and ` we see that ` is a skeptical conclusion: the modus
ponens argument of ∆e
e
s
;`
prevails. This conforms with our criterion of evaluation, to reflect with a
skeptical conclusion the overwhelming majority of responses for She will study late in the library
in this first group (96/88%)9.
For Group II, the argumentation analysis is essentially the same as for Group I. The new aware-
ness of She has a textbook to read (t) does not have a significant effect. In particular, it does not
introduce any new arguments supporting ` and hence ` remains a skeptical conclusion, as required
by the overwhelming majority (96%/93%) also in Group II.
For Group III, the cognitive state of its participants, is S = ({e}, {e, `, o}). Differently from
Group I and Group II, we can now construct another strong argument for ` based on the hypothesis
prediction scheme for o together with the necessary prediction scheme for ` (Figure 4, `):
∆
o,o
n
;`
= {hyp(o), necc p(o; `)}.
9Here, and in the sequel, the first percentage refers to the results in (Byrne, 1989), and the second percentage refers
to the results in (Dieussaert et al., 2000).
29
∆e
e
s
;`
1, `
∆e
e
s
;`
∆
o,o
n
;`
2
∆e
e
s
;`
∆
o,o
n
;`
∆o
3-4
∆e
e
s
;`
∪∆o
∆o
∆o
5-2, repeat
∆
o,o
n
;`
1, `
∆
o,o
n
;`
∆e
e
s
;`
2
∆
o,o
n
;`
∆e
e
s
;`
∆
o,o
n
;`
3-4
Figure 4: Construction for ` (left) and ` (right) in Group III given e.
In Figure 4 (left) we see how ∆
o,o
n
;`
attacks the modus ponens argument ∆e
e
s
;`
. This in turn is able
to defend against ∆
o,o
n
;`
with the help of ∆o = {hyp(o)} by opposing the hypothesis part hyp(o)
inside ∆
o,o
n
;`
. Thus ∆e
e
s
;`
∪∆o can defend against all its attacks and so it is an acceptable argument
for `. On the other hand, Figure 4 (right) shows how ∆
o,o
n
;`
supporting ` can itself defend against
its attack by ∆e
e
s
;`
, as necc p(o ; `) in ∆
o,o
n
;`
is stronger than suff p(e ; `) in ∆e
e
s
;`
. Hence
∆
o,o
n
;`
is an acceptable argument for `.10
Summing up, we see that in Group III both ` and `, are plausible (credulous) conclusions. This
then accounts for the observed suppression effect, as here only 38%/60% concluded that She will
study late in the library. It is likely, that these participants constructed only the argument ∆e
e
s
;`
for
` and hence concluded definitely `. It seems likely that the other 62%/40% of the participants were
able to construct both ∆e
e
s
;`
and ∆
o,o
n
;`
and hence were not (skeptically) sure that ` held. How-
ever, as already mentioned earlier, the percentages of the other two answer possibilities were not
reported, and thus possibly, some participants skeptically concluded that ` held (ignoring ∆e
e
s
;`
).
5.3 She does not have an essay to finish
In this second case all three groups were given the fact that She does not have an essay to finish
(e) and were asked whether She will study late in the library (`). Similarly to the previous case,
for Group I the corresponding cognitive state is S = ({e}, {e, `}).
Figure 5 (left) shows two arguments that support `, one based on the hypothesis scheme for e:
∆
e,e
s
;`
= {hyp(e), suff p(e; `)},
and another by simply hypothesizing `, namely the argument ∆` = {hyp(`)}. The first argument,
∆
e,e
s
;`
, is easily defeated (i.e. attacked with no defense against the attack) by the factual argument
∆e = {fact(e)} that attacks the weak part, hyp(e), of ∆
e,e
s
;`
.
10The optimization of the dialectic argumentation process in Figure 4 (only with strong attacks), stops after (3-5).
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Figure 5: Construction for ` (left) and ` (right) in Group I (similarly for Group III) given e, when e is
understood as sufficient and necessary.
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Figure 6: Construction for ` (left) and ` (right) in Group I (similarly for Group II and III) given e, when e is
understood only as sufficient.
The other argument, ∆`, for ` is defeated by a strong argument supporting `, constructed from
the factual scheme for e and the necc p(e; `) scheme:
∆e
e
n
;`
= {fact(e), necc p(e; `)}.
This is indeed a strong argument for ` and as shown in Figure 5 (right) it is able to defend against
its attacks. Hence ` is an acceptable plausible conclusion whereas ` is not so. Thus ` is a skeptical
definite conclusion. This corresponds to what about half of the participants (46%/49%) concluded,
namely that She will not study late in the library. This is similar for Group III (63%/49%). Note
that this conclusion depends on the assumption that participants consider e also as a necessary
condition in e; `, which enables the necessary prediction scheme, necc p(e; `) that is in ∆e
e
n
;`
.
For those participants who understand e only as a sufficient condition the argumentation process
is depicted in Figure 6. Figure 6 (left) shows that ∆`, can now only be attacked by the opposite
hypothetical argument ∆`, which it can easily defend against, and so ` is acceptable. Similarly,
the only argument for ` is based on the hypothesis scheme for `. Figure 6 (right) shows that ∆`
is acceptable when combined with ∆e which is needed as a defense against the second attack of
∆
e,e
s
;`
(Figure 6.2b). Hence both ` and ` are plausible conclusions when e is understood only as
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a sufficient condition, which covers the other half of participants, (54%/51%), that did not choose
the definite conclusion She will not study late in the library.
Lets us now consider Group II where a significant suppression effect is observed. Hence,
participants are additionally made aware of She might (not) have a textbook to read, where She has
a textbook to read (t) is a sufficient condition for `. The cognitive state that represents this group
is S = ({e}, {e, `, t}). Now e in e ; ` cannot be understood as a necessary condition anymore,
because an alternative reason, t, for ` is made aware by the second conditional. Hence with the
absence of necc p(e; `) we cannot construct a strong argument for `. Consequently, the majority
is more likely to construct, in the way we saw above for Group I, acceptable arguments for either
conclusion, ` and `, and thus both follow credulously.
This accounts for the fact that the majority of the participants did not conclude a definite answer,
i.e. only 4%/22% concluded that She will not study late in the library.
5.4 She will study late in the library
In this third case, all groups were asked whether She has an essay to finish (e), given the factual
information that She will study late in the library (`). Hence the arguments that we need to consider
are not for ` or ` as in the previous cases but for e and e.
In this case (as well as the next case of the experiment whose given factual information is
She will not study late in the library) where the factual information concerns the consequent, it
is natural to assume that a significant amount of participants entered into an explanatory mode
(or diagnostic mode). In this mode these participants tried to explain the factual observation in
the context of the information that they are given in each group. We will therefore analyze both
modes of reasoning, predictive and explanatory. As above we will also consider the two cases
where participants understood e in the conditional statement, e ; `, as a sufficient and necessary
condition and others understood e only as sufficient, although this will not be significant for the
explanatory mode.
5.4.1 Prediction mode: She has an essay to finish is necessary and sufficient
For those participants in Group I who understood e as sufficient and necessary in e; `, a (strong)
argument for e is based on the fact scheme for ` together with the secondary necessary prediction
scheme for e:
∆`
`
n
;e
= {fact(`), sec necc p(`; e)}.
Even though
∆
`
s
;e
= {hyp(`), sec suff p(`; e)}
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Figure 7: Construction for e (left) and e (right) in Group I (similarly for Group III) given `, when e in e; `
is understood as sufficient and necessary.
attacks ∆`
`
n
;e
, it can be easily defeated by the (strong) factual argument, ∆` = {fact(`)}, as Fig-
ure 7 (left) shows. Indeed, ∆
`
s
;e
is cognitively improbable, i.e. it is unlikely to be considered by
someone exactly because it directly contradicts the known fact that She will study late in the li-
brary. Similarly, the other counterargument against ∆`
`
n
;e
, namely ∆e = {hyp(e)} can be simply
defended against by ∆`
`
n
;e
itself.
Figure 7 (right) shows that no argument for e is acceptable. In both cases, they have strong
counterarguments (∆`
`
n
;e
and ∆`, respectively), which they cannot defend against. Summing up,
when e in e ; ` is understood also as a necessary condition, in a predictive mode or reasoning
we can construct acceptable arguments only for e and thus e follows skeptically. This captures the
observation that a significant part of the participants, 71%/53% concluded that She has an essay to
finish.
5.4.2 Explanatory mode: She has an essay to finish is only sufficient
The participants in Group I (29%/47%) who were not sure whether She has an essay to finish
holds, might have entered in explanatory mode. Thus explanatory schemes can be applied to
explain the given observation, that She will study late in the library. Furthermore, participants who
did not understand e in e; ` as necessary may have considered that there is a possibility of some
other unknown explanation for `, thus using the exogenous explanation scheme. Such alternative
exogenous explanation can help to support the opposite hypothesis of an explanation: in this case
to support the hypothesis e opposing the explanation e.
Figure 8 (left) shows the acceptability of the following explanatory argument supporting e:
∆`
`
s
;e
= {fact(`), suff e(`; e)},
which can be attacked by
∆`
`
s
;exo
= {fact(`), exo e(`; exo(l))},
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Figure 8: Construction for e (left) and e (right) in Group I (similarly for Group II and III) given `, when e
is understood only as sufficient.
an argument for an alternative explanation constructed via the explanation scheme, exo e(l) =
(`, exo(l)). ∆`
`
s
;e
and ∆`
`
s
;exo
can defend against each other and thus ∆`
`
s
;e
is acceptable.
Figure 8 (right) shows the acceptable argument supporting e. The weak hypothesis argument
∆e is defended with the help of ∆`
`
s
;exo
and hence ∆e ∪∆`
`
s
;exo
is acceptable for e. In other words,
the hypothesis that She does not have an essay to finish can stand up as valid by assuming that
there was some other unknown reason for which She will study late in the library.
Summarizing, we can construct acceptable arguments for both, e and for e, and thus e is only
a plausible (credulous) conclusions. This reflects well the other significant amount of partici-
pants (29%/47%) who did not choose to answer that She has an essay to finish. Furthermore, we
note, that this split in the answers can be captured for one part of the participants (29%/47%) the
possibility of an unknown exogenous explanation and for the other part (61%/53%) not allowing
exogenous explanations.
Lets us now consider Group II, where a suppression effect is observed. In this group for most
participants (i) it is unlikely to consider e as a necessary condition and (ii) the possibility of an
alternative explanation, such as exo(l), for the observed fact is made explicit: As t ∈ A, we
can apply the explanatory scheme, suff e(` ; t) = (`, t), from which we can construct a new
argument:
∆`
`
s
;t
= {fact(`), suff e(`; t)}.
We can then construct acceptable arguments for both e and e in the same way as we have
shown above by simply replacing ∆`
`
s
;exo
with this explicit form of an alternative explanation ∆`
`
s
;t
:
the construction is completely analogous as in Figures 8. Accordingly, e and e are credulous
conclusions for most participants, which reflects well the suppression effect in the second group,
as there was no majority (only 13%/16%), that concluded that She has an essay to finish.
Finally, for Group III we can apply a similar analysis as in Group I to account in an analogous
way for the split in the answers: about half of the participants (54%/53%) concluded that She has
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Figure 9: Construction for e (left) and e (right) in Group I (similarly for Group II) given `, when e is
understood as sufficient (prediction mode).
an essay to finish. This is because the extra information given or made aware of in Group III,
namely the (necessary) condition the library is open does not offer any new explanatory arguments
for the given observation that She will study late in the library.
5.5 She will not study late in the library
In the fourth and last case of the experiment, all groups were asked whether She has an essay to
finish (e), given that She will not study late in the library (`).
In this case of the experiment, there is a significant discrepancy between the results provided
in (Byrne, 1989) and in (Dieussaert et al., 2000): Whereas in Group I and Group II in (Byrne,
1989), above 90% answered that She does not have an essay to finish, in (Dieussaert et al., 2000),
only 69% gave that answer in the same groups. One way of explaining this difference, is that
in (Byrne, 1989), (almost) all of the participants in these two groups reasoned in the prediction
mode, whereas in (Dieussaert et al., 2000) some participants in Group I and Group II might have
reasoned in the explanation mode instead.
As in the case of Section 5.4 we will analyze both modes of reasoning, predictive and ex-
planatory, assuming that again it is natural for some participants to reason in explanatory mode as
the factual information given to them concerns the consequent of the conditional(s) in the general
information (or the context) with which they are given to reason with.
The cognitive states for Group I, II and III are ({`}, {e, `}), ({`}, {e, `, t}) and ({`}, {e, `, o}),
respectively.
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5.5.1 Prediction Mode
Let us first consider those participants that reason in the prediction mode and ask if they can build
acceptable arguments for e or e. For Group I, a cognitively plausible and strong argument for e is:
∆`
`
s
;e
= {fact(`), sec suff p(`; e)}.
which is able to defend against any of its attacks (see Figure 9, right). Hence ∆`
`
s
;e
is an acceptable
argument for e. For supporting e, a possible argument consists of the hypothesis scheme for e
(Figure 9, left):
∆e = {hyp(e)}.
However, ∆e is attacked by ∆`
`
s
;e
against which ∆e cannot defend, and so ∆e is not acceptable.
Note that this attack against ∆e by ∆`
`
s
;e
reflects the informal counterargument that If she had
an essay to finish, then she would study late in the library but we are told that She will not study late
in the library. In more formal terms this is a Reductio ad Absurdum counterargument rendering
the hypothesis that She has an essay to finish as non acceptable. Similarly, the argument ∆`
`
s
;e
for e (Figure 9, right), can be recognized as reasoning with modus tollens in an argumentation
perspective.
Hence, there is no acceptable argument for e, and thus e is a definite skeptical conclusion. This
corresponds well with the high majority of the participants (92%) in (Byrne, 1989) who concluded
and answered that She does not have an essay to finish.
The case for Group II is analogous to that for Group I conforming with the same observed
result (96%). Also for Group III, participants who reason in a predictive mode will reach the same
result of e being a skeptical conclusion. But this is not observed in the experimental data where
we have a significant reduction in the number of participants who answer that e holds. In addition,
as mentioned above, in the second experiment in (Dieussaert et al., 2000) even for Groups I and
II the percentage of participants that answered that e holds is only 69%, thus not all participants
(skeptically) concluded e. One way to account for these two observations is to consider that a
significant number of participants in Group III and similarly in Groups I and II in the (Dieussaert
et al., 2000) experiment, reason in an explanation mode, as we will describe below.
5.5.2 Explanatory Mode
In an explanatory mode of reasoning we can explain the given factual information of ` either using
the explanatory argument scheme, necc e(` ; e), or sec suff e(` ; e), depending on whether e
is understood as a necessary condition for ` or not. Accordingly, we construct the following two
arguments:
∆`
`
n
;e
= {fact(`), necc e(`; e)} and ∆`
`
s
;e
= {fact(`), sec suff e(`; e)}.
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Figure 10: Construction for e (left), e with exogenous argument (middle) and e (right) in Group I given `,
when e is understood as sufficient and necessary (explanatory mode).
Figure 10 (right) shows that ∆`
`
n
;e
is acceptable. Analogously, ∆`
`
s
;e
is also acceptable (we can
replace ∆`
`
n
;e
with ∆`
`
s
;e
).
What about arguments supporting e? The hypothesis argument, ∆e as shown in Figure 10 (left)
is not acceptable. But can we find another argument to defend against its attack? Analogously to
the previous case in Section 5.4, we can defend ∆e by considering alternative explanation schemes
which are incompatible with those in the attacks ∆`
`
s
;e
and ∆`
`
n
;e
(see Table 6 on the incompati-
bility between explanation schemes). For Group I, the only other explanation is an exogenous one
through which we can build an alternative explanatory argument:
∆
`
n
;exo
= {fact(`), necc e(`; exo)}.
Figure 10 (middle) then illustrates this defense through ∆
`
n
;exo
and hence ∆e ∪ ∆` n;exo forms an
acceptable argument for e.
Summarizing the analysis for Group I, for the participants that did not have an exogenous
explanation and thus ∆
`
n
;exo
in mind, e follows skeptically accounting thus for the experimental
observation of (69% in (Dieussaert et al., 2000)) answering that e holds. But when ∆
`
n
;exo
is
considered as an argument, then both, e and e are credulous conclusions. This accounts for the
other participants in Group I , likely to be the 31% in (Dieussaert et al., 2000), who were not sure
whether e holds.
Let us now consider Group II. In this case we have a second sufficient condition (t) and hence
we can now construct two arguments based on the secondary sufficient explanation for `:
∆`
`
s
;e
= {fact(`), sec suff e(`; e)} and ∆`
`
s
;t
= {fact(`), sec suff e(`; t)}.
But differently from the third case in the previous subsection, ∆`
`
s
;e
and ∆`
`
s
;t
are not incom-
patible with each other (see Table 3) but rather components of an explanation that would apply in
different contexts. Hence the existence of the second argument does not affect the acceptability
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Figure 11: Construction for e (left) and e (right) in Group III given `, when e is understood only as sufficent
(explanatory mode).
of the arguments for e or e in an explanatory mode as presented for Group I above. This then
conforms with the fact that in this case the experimental results for Group II are identical to those
for Group I.
Finally, let us consider Group III. Participants were made aware of the possibility of an explicit
or concrete alternative explanation for the given observation, namely that the reason for She will
not study late in the library is that library might not be open. This means that participants can
construct the argument
∆`
`
n
;o
= {fact(`), necc e(`; o)}.
As necc e(` ; o) is incompatible with the explanatory schemes supporting e, this new argument
will defend against the arguments for e, namely against ∆`
`
n
;e
and ∆`
`
s
;e
. Hence ∆`
`
n
;o
can take
the place of ∆
`
n
;exo
in the analysis of the explanatory argumentative reasoning in the previous
groups (e.g. we can replace ∆
`
n
;exo
with ∆`
`
n
;o
in Figure 10). Furthermore, the acceptability of
the explanatory arguments supporting e are not affected by the existence of this new explanatory
argument supporting o, as these are of equal strength and therefore they can defend against each
other.
Hence the suppression effect in Group III can be accounted for simply by assuming that a
higher proportion of the participants (in comparison with Groups I and II) thought of an alternative
explanation, i.e. other than that of e, now that they are made explicitly aware of the possible expla-
nation of the library not being open. Only those participants who did not consider an alternative
explanation concluded for sure that e holds and indeed the proportion of participants that did so
was significantly lower (33%/44%).
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Predictive Explanatory Experimental Results
Given Group suff&necc suff suff&necc suff Byrne (1989) Dieussaert et al. (2000)
e I ` ` - - 96% ` 88% `
e II - ` - - 96% ` 93% `
e III `,` `, ` - - 38% ` 60% `
e I ` `,` - - 46% ` 49% `
e II - `,` - - 4% ` 22% `
e III ` `,` - - 63% ` 49% `
` I e e, e e ? e,e 71% e 53% e
` II - e, e - e,e 13% e 16% e
` III e e, e e ? e,e 54% e 55% e
` I e e e ? e,e e ? e,e 92% e 69% e
` II - e - e ? e,e 96% e 69% e
` III e e e,e e,e 33% e 44% e
Table 7: Results of the suppression task modeled within cognitive argumentation. Dark gray cells denote
the conclusions that have been given by ∼ 90%, and light gray cells denote the conclusions that have been
given by a significant percentage (30%-70%). The framed cells show the suppression effect. The skeptical
conclusions denoted by ? are the cases where an exogenous explanation is not considered.
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5.6 Summary of all cases of the BST experiments
Table 7 gives a summary of the analysis of the cognitive argumentation reasoning for each of the
four cases of the suppression task. The first column shows the given fact: e, e, ` or `, respectively.
The second column refers to the groups. Column three and four denote the conclusions within
cognitive argumentation derived when participants are assumed to be in the predictive mode of
reasoning, where ‘suff&necc’ and ‘suff’ mean that e is understood as sufficient and necessary or
only sufficient, respectively. Note that, whenever only one conclusion is listed in any of these four
columns, then the conclusion is skeptically entailed (definite), otherwise, it is credulously entailed
(possible). This applies analogously for the explanatory mode of reasoning in columns five and
six. In the four columns (columns 3 to 6), ‘-’ means that this case does not seem to be cognitively
plausible. Finally, columns seven and eight show the experimental results from (Byrne, 1989)
and (Dieussaert et al., 2000), so that we can compare them with our conclusions. The framed cells
in columns 7 and 8 show where the suppression effect occurs.
This table summarizes the analysis presented above and reveals the following two results by
comparing the entries in columns 7 and 8 with the corresponding entries in columns 3-6:
Suppression: Observed suppression coincides with the loss, in the suppression group, of skeptical
conclusions drawn in the other two groups. The conclusion at hand is exclusively skeptical or
can be skeptical in the other two groups whereas in the suppression group it is predominantly
credulous. It is therefore more likely for participants in the suppression group to consider
the conclusion only plausible and hence avoid choosing the conclusion in their answer.
Variation: Observed significant variation in the answers in any case and any group coincides
with the conclusion at hand been credulous. Across all rows whenever the percentages in
columns 7 and 8 are overwhelmingly high we only have skeptical conclusions in the corre-
sponding columns 3 to 6 and whenever the percentages are split we have credulous conclu-
sions in columns 3 to 6.
Hence the approach of Cognitive Argumentation offers a model that captures the suppression
effect as well as offering an account for the qualitative difference in the degree of certainty, across
the population, for the conclusions drawn.
These results stem from two important properties of Cognitive Argumentation: (i) its natural
distinction between definite and plausible conclusions via the formal notions of skeptical and cred-
ulous conclusions, (ii) its property to adapt to new and different forms of information resulting in
a context-sensitive form of reasoning.
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6 COGNICA – Cognitive Argumentation on the Web
Systems of Cognitive Argumentation can easily be built using existing argumentation technology
from AI. We have developed a web based system, called COGNICA11, based on the underlying
technology of Gorgias (Kakas et al., 2019).12
The general long-term aim of COGNICA is to build a cognitive reasoner with a simple and
natural interface so that it can be used easily by humans at large. The purpose is to use this
system (i) to evaluate the theoretical developments in the framework of Cognitive Argumentation
and (ii) to support new experimental studies that would help with the further development of the
framework.
At this initial stage of development of COGNICA our first aim is confined to testing the model
of Cognitive Argumentation on human conditional reasoning and to confirm its realizability. The
specific goal is to be able to reproduce the type of reasoning found in the psychological experiment
of Byrne’s suppression task and confirm the theoretical results presented in this paper.
In designing COGNICA we have set the following functional requirements:
• Accept conditional common sense knowledge given in the form of controlled natural lan-
guage.
• Reason with two levels of confidence: certain with definite answers and possible with plau-
sible answers.
• Reason from observations to explanations.
• Reason to conclusions based on explanations accounting for the observations.
• Provide explanations to users on how the system has arrived at a certain definite (skeptical)
or possible (credulous) conclusion.
The internal operation of the system is required to be completely transparent to the human user
with a natural interaction which does not require the user to have any knowledge of the underlying
process of computational argumentation.
To illustrate the system let us consider how we would use it to test its reasoning behaviour in
the case of Byrne’s suppression task. For each group we can enter under a different heading or
context the general conditional information given to the group. Figure 12 shows the case of Group
III.
11http://cognica.cs.ucy.ac.cy/
12http://www.cs.ucy.ac.cy/˜nkd/gorgias/, http://gorgiasb.tuc.gr/
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Figure 12: Knowledge for Group III as represented in COGNICA.
As can be seen from this figure, conditional knowledge that is based on a sufficient condition
is entered in a Whenever statement, directly linking the condition with the consequent, whereas
knowledge based on a necessary condition is entered in the form of a When statement, expressing
a link between the negation of the condition with the negation of the consequent.
We can then select factual information and query the system for conclusions. For example, we
can select that She has an essay to finish holds and ask whether She will study late in the library
holds. Figure 13 shows this case where the answer of the system ismaybe expressing that the
system considers this as possible but not definite. The figure also shows an explanation of why this
is so. The explanation is presented in the form of a controlled natural language, giving the reasons
for why the query may hold or may not hold, each of which reflecting the acceptable arguments in
the theory of Cognitive Argumentation for the query and its complement (see case 1, presented in
Section 5.2). Similarly, we can give the system factual information asking the system to provide
explanations for this and to predict if some conditions would necessarily hold or not.
As mentioned above, our future plans for developing and using the COGNICA system is to
set up crowd source experiments similar to those of Byrne’s suppression task, in order to gather
information on how humans reason in different circumstances. The results of these experiments
will then be integrated in our plan of developing further the framework of Cognitive Argumen-
tation. Another interesting question to examine is how human users are affected by the system
in their representation and reasoning of the problem: (i) COGNICA explicitly asks for placing
conditionals within a when or whenever sentence, which forces users to consciously distinguish
between different types of conditions. (ii) COGNICA’s argumentative reasoning might affect the
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Figure 13: Case 1, She has an essay to finish, for group III.
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reasoning of the users as soon as they are presented with the explanation of how the system arrives
at its conclusions.
7 Discussion
We have formulated human conditional reasoning in terms of argumentation and evaluated our
approach on the results of the suppression task. As Cognitive Argumentation can account for all
cases of the task, it seems to form a good basis for developing a cognitively adequate model of
human reasoning at large.
7.1 Cognitive Argumentation at Large
Let us summarize the essential elements of Cognitive Argumentation. First, argument schemes
provide a succinct form of knowledge representation, which allows us to uniformly capture facts,
hypotheses or associations between information. Second, a strength relation between the schemes
complements the representation. It flexibly has three important properties: it is partial, qualitative
and context-sensitive. Third, reasoning is then captured via a dialectic argumentation process of
attacks and defenses between arguments supporting (or not) conclusions of interest.
Argument scheme associations are not only categorized by the types of conditions they involve
but also by the modes of reasoning. Whereas modus ponens and denial of the antecedent belong
to a predictive mode, affirmation of the consequent and modus tollens belong to a explanatory
(diagnostic) mode. This classification results in important cognitive distinctions in the reasoning.
For instance the discriminatory and competing nature of explanations in explanatory reasoning is
absent in predictive reasoning. These features together help to match closer the cognitive reasoning
behaviour of humans in general. Individual differences in reasoning amount to choosing different
arguments and different degrees of scrutiny apply in determining the acceptability or validity of
the chosen arguments.
Another essential notion within CA is that of a cognitive state. The cognitive state represents
the current context of a limited subset of concepts and knowledge associated to them that we are
(consciously) aware of and where our attention in reasoning is currently focused. The dialectic
argumentation process of reasoning is guided by this cognitive state, which also affects when
to terminate the process, even if the process has not been exhaustively carried out. This is in
accordance to human reasoning in everyday tasks, where weighing up all possibilities would be
infeasible, and therefore decisions are guided by heuristically restricting our consideration.
It is important to notice that the local (conditional) knowledge in the current context is captured
by argument schemes that have a simple form. We do not need to include explicitly in the premises
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of an argument scheme additional premises that would preclude exceptional or adversarial cases. In
other words, whenever there is no need, or awareness made to assume differently, then the normal
case is assumed. Consider the (modus ponens) scheme suff p(e ; `): the additional plethora
of possible extra premises such as She is not ill or The deadline has not passed, or She has not
decided to drop the course, or indeed that The library is open, would only need to be accounted
for, whenever the current context brings them to the foreground. Whenever this is the case, these
can be addressed through counterarguments from separate and equally simple argument schemes,
as we have seen for example in the first case for Group III.
7.2 Future Work
The major long term challenge of CA as a cognitive model, particularly in an open setting of rea-
soning, lies in recognizing the context at hand within a dynamic environment, suitably adapting the
argumentation framework when the context changes or is refined with further information. What
happens if Group III receives the extra information, that She has the library keys? Will this affect
their conclusions, and how? Does this only affect what argument schemes to consider, or does
it also affect the strength relation between them? We therefore need to understand in detail how
does this cognitive state of humans get formed (and altered) and how the current argumentation
framework is populated with the relevant knowledge of argument schemes in the current context
that we are in.
This goal drives our future work which will revolve along three aspects. Firstly, can we test
(partially) the cognitive inferential adequacy of our CA model? If yes, how should be the ex-
perimental setup such that we can recoard how participants have arrived or are supporting their
conclusions? Can we challenge humans with new counterarguments that introduce extra elements
into their cognitive state of awareness and monitor their reasoning process? Secondly, a major
challenge is to link the whole framework and process of Cognitive Argumentation with Natural
language, and in particular the way language is used to point to the current state of awareness
and context of knowledge of argument schemes. COGNICA, is a first step towards this direction,
starting from a controlled natural language user interface, which we plan to incrementally develop
as close as possible to (free) natural language, employing the help of powerful existing NLP tools.
Finally, in order to understand how CA relates to practical human reasoning, we plan to apply
this framework to human decision making as it is studied in the field of Behavioural Economics,
based on (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Home economic and similarly moral decisions taken by
people at large, have been observed to deviate from logically strict but also from the rational form
of reasoning, but rather follow a heavily biased form of reasoning. As several studies have shown,
small changes within the framing of a task, e.g. saying saves 90 out of 100 rather than kills 10 out
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of 100, has a very significant change in the final decisions of participants (Ku¨hberger, 1995). Our
initial investigation indicates that experimental observations of a significant change or reversal in a
human decision can be accounted for in Cognitive Argumentation in a very similar manner as the
suppression effect.
7.3 Related Work
The framework of Cognitive Argumentation is built in a multidisciplinary approach, bringing to-
gether work from AI and Cognitive Science/Psychology. In both of these areas it was long recog-
nized that human logical reasoning would need to transcend classical formal logic. In particular,
reasoning should be non-monotonic where conclusions could not hold anymore when the context
of information is changed.
The feature of non-monotonicity in logic-based AI was identified from the very start in the
seminal work of McCarthy, “Programs with Common Sense” (McCarthy, 1995) and work there-
after, with a biannual workshop series starting in 1978. An intense activity on defining new non-
monotonic logics followed using a variety of formal approaches. During this however, the original
objective of modeling human commonsense reasoning shifted out of focus (McDermott, 1987).
The proposed approaches were mostly theoretical and did not apply to real case studies, possibly
because the expertise of cognitive scientists was not consulted.
An important development in the study of non-monotonic logics in AI was the relatively recent
introduction of formal argumentation. Several works, see e.g. (Bondarenko, Dung, Kowalski, &
Toni, 1997), had shown that argumentation provides a uniform basis for reformulating most if not
all different existing proposals of non-monotonic logics. Nevertheless, the study of argumentation
was also primarily motivated by and confined to the formal aspects of the framework, under the
same culture that capturing human reasoning is just a matter of finding first the right logical frame-
work: a matter of pure logic. Exceptions to this perspective, where cognitive considerations play
at least a limited role, are the study of legal reasoning through argumentation (Prakken, 2011) and
the more recent work on reviews and debate analysis using argumentation technology (Lawrence,
Snaith, Konat, Budzynska, & Reed, 2017).
Within Cognitive Psychology/Science it was long recognized that formal logic will not serve
as a good model for human reasoning. Several cognitive models have been proposed motivated
primarily from experimental results of observing human reasoning and thus trying to formulate
theories that would fit in the characteristics of human reasoning, such as its non-monotonic de-
feasible nature. The list of these works is very long. We mention here only some, to which our
approach comes closer. These inlude the work of (Stenning & van Lambalgen, 2008) with an
approach linked with the non-monotonic nature of logic programming, the proposal of (Pollock,
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1987) where argumentation plays a significant role in a holistic proposal for cognition, similarly
the approach of (Mercier & Sperber, 2011) where argumentation is considered central to human
reasoning and several works on conditional reasoning whose exposition can be found in the book
of (Nickerson, 2015). More recent work, following the Logic Programming approach of (Stenning
& van Lambalgen, 2008), is found in (Dietz Saldanha, Ho¨lldobler, & Mo¨rbitz, 2018), where cogni-
tive principles to customize the formal logical system was adopted and which methodology we are
following in this paper. A recent special issue of the Ku¨nstliche Intelligenz Journal, 33(2), 2019, on
Cognitive Reasoning, exposes state of the art challenges for understanding and automating human
reasoning.
Our approach concurs closely with the framework of mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983;
Khemlani, Byrne, & Johnson-Laird, 2018) with its emphasis on human reasoning as cases of pos-
sibilities. Argumentation is by nature a process of considering alternatives and thus argumentative
reasoning is inherently possibilistic. Building acceptable arguments in Cognitive Argumentation
can be seen to correspond closely to the process of constructing mental (cognitive) models. Our
correspondence of the different types of conditions, sufficient or necessary, into distinct argument
schemes with a separate identity and the distinction between predictive and explanatory schemes
(again drawn from the same conditional) can be reflected into the different possibilities of mental
models associated to conditionals. Having drawn this parallel, it must be noted that the theory of
mental models includes extensive studies on how to recognize these distinctions from the form of
the expression of a conditional in natural language and other pragmatics in the context of reason-
ing. This is an aspect that is currently missing in our approach and which can benefit greatly from
the existing work.
On another level of comparison, as we have seen, Cognitive Argumentation supports two types
of conclusions with a qualitative difference in the confidence or certainty of the conclusion: plau-
sible or possible and definite conclusions. This stems form the relative strength between different
argument schemes that is qualitative, although it can be learned through a quantitative statistical
analysis from past experiences (Michael, 2016). As in the more recent work (Khemlani et al.,
2018; Khemlani & Johnson-Laird, 2019) within the framework of mental models, such natural
distinctions between the “degree” of conclusions would correspond closer to real-life human rea-
soning than formal logical modalities of “possible” and “necessary” in the framework of Modal
Logics.
8 Conclusion
We have seen how human reasoning can be formulated within a framework of dialectic argumen-
tation, called Cognitive Argumentation, where reasoning to conclusions is understood as a process
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of contemplating between alternatives and the arguments that support them. The framework of
Cognitive Argumentation is based on the theory of computational argumentation from relatively
recent studies of argumentation in AI. It uses a variety of general cognitive principles of reasoning,
identified in Cognitive Science and Philosophy over many decades, to “calibrate” the abstract and
general framework from AI in order to adapt and apply it to the case of informal human reasoning.
The salient features of context-sensitive reasoning, variability of reasoning within the population,
distinguishing definite and possible conclusions, and the defeasibility of reasoning, all emerge
naturally within the framework of Cognitive Argumentation.
Cognitive Argumentation has been validated as a good cognitive adequate model of human
reasoning by explaining well the reasoning behaviors of participants in the celebrated experiments
of the suppression task. Although we have concentrated here on reasoning with conditionals the
framework is general enough to accommodate wider forms of human reasoning by suitably extend-
ing it with argument schemes appropriate for new reasoning forms and sculpting this with further
relevant cognitive principles. This is a difficult and challenging task, but one that promises to be in-
structive in forming a better and more complete understanding of the relationship of argumentation
with human reasoning at large.
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